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INTRODUCTION
In Clay v. Sun Insurance Office, Ltd.' Justice Frankfurter credited
the Florida Legislature with "rare foresight" in dealing with "the problem
of authoritatively determining unresolved state law involved in federal
litigation by [enacting] a statute which permits a federal court to certify
such a doubtful question of state law to the Supreme Court of Florida
for its decision." 2 That the foresight was rare is beyond question. Whether
it was wise is still open to debate. In the interest of full disclosure it
should be mentioned that this article focuses on the negative aspects of
the certification procedure.
* Member of the Florida Bar; J.D., U. of Miami; LL.M., Yale University; Associate
Professor of Law, The University of Nebraska.
1. 363 U.S. 207 (1960).
2. Id. at 212.
3. The following articles are favorable to certification: Kaplan, Certification of Questions
from Federal Appellate Courts to the Florida Supreme Court and Its Impact on the Absten-
tion Doctrine, 16 U. MIAMI L. REV. 413 (1962); Kurland, Toward a Cooperative judicial
Federalism: The Federal Court Abstention Doctrine,. 24 F.R.D. 481 (1959); McKusick,
Certification: A Procedure for Cooperation Between State and Federal Courts, 16 U. ME.
L. REV. 33 (1964); Note, Consequences of Abstention by a Federal Court, 73 HARV. L. REV.
717
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I. THE PROBLEM
A. Its Root
Certification of questions of state law is a by-product of the "absten-
tion doctrine," "that willful, perhaps even illegitimate, child of the Erie-
Tompkins rule."4
The Erie rule requires federal courts to apply state law in many of
the civil cases -that come before them. This puts a burden on the court to
determine what is the state law. Sometimes the burden is a light one, as
it is when the matter is covered by a clearly written statute, or when the
highest court of the state has recently declared its position regarding the
issue in controversy. However, when the state statute under consideration
is ambiguous, or when there are no clear and controlling precedents from
the highest state court, the burden of determining state law becomes a
heavy one. Often the federal court has to guess how the highest state
court would decide the case.5 Compelling reasons may exist for wanting
to refrain from making such a guess.
In Railroad Commission of Texas v. Pullman Co.' the Supreme
Court gave birth to the "abstention doctrine" whereby a federal court
may refuse to exercise its jurisdiction to decide cases involving questions
of state law.
B. The Reasons for Abstention
[A]bstention is variously recognized: (1) to avoid decision of
a federal constitutional question where the case may be disposed
of on questions of state law; (2) to avoid needless conflict
with the administration by a state of its own affairs; (3) to
leave to the states the resolution of unsettled questions of state
law; and (4) to ease the congestion of the federal court docket.
These various doctrines overlap at times . .. .
The case law that has emerged under the abstention doctrine makes
it fairly clear that abstention from the exercise of properly invoked
jurisdiction is not proper when used merely to avoid the difficulty of as-
certaining state law, 8 nor is it proper when the state law is clearly set-
tled.' The most widely accepted uses of abstention are: to avoid deciding
1358 (1960); Note, Inter-Jurisdictional Certification: Beyond Abstention Toward Co-
operative Judicial Federalism, 111 U. PA. L. REV. 344 (1963).
4. Clark, Federal Procedural Reform and States' Rights: to a More Perfect Union, 40
TEX. L. REV. 211, 218 (1961).
5. This situation occurs when there is no state law of any kind on the point being
litigated.
The federal court must keep in mind, however, that its function is not to choose the
rule which it would adopt for itself, if free to do so, but to choose the rule which
it believes the state court, from all that is known about its methods of reaching
decisions, is likely in the future to adopt.
C. A. WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS § 58, at 206 (1963). [Hereinafter cited as WRIcHT.]
6. 312 U.S. 496 (1941).
7. WRIGIT § 52.
8. McNeese v. Bd. of Educ., 373 U.S. 668, 673, n. 5 (1963); Meredith v. City of
Winterhaven, 320 U.S. 228 (1943).
9. Public Util. Comm'n v. United States, 355 U.S. 534 (1958).
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a federal constitutional question where the case may be disposed of on
questions of state law which are unsettled, and to avoid needless conflict
with the administration by a state of its own affairs.' °
Although some of the court-made abstention rules are easily ascer-
tainable," the very fact that over fifty cases involving issues of abstention
have reached the Supreme Court since 1940 makes it clear that the doc-
trine, as a whole, is unclear.
C. The Cost of Abstention
When a federal court abstains from exercising its jurisdiction because
of perplexities relating to state law it may: (1) retain jurisdiction to de-
cide the federal questions in the case; (2) totally release its jurisdiction,
thereby allowing the state court to decide all of the issues; or (3) order
the parties to seek state adjudication on some or all of the issues in the
case, while retaining jurisdiction to decide any issue that cannot be
promptly adjudicated in the state courts.
Whatever course is chosen, the cost of abstention to the litigants may
prove to be very high in terms of time, money, and perhaps anguish and
despair.'2 Once the federal court has abstained, the party seeking relief
must often begin his lawsuit anew at the bottom of the state court hier-
archy and struggle to reach the highest state court.'3 He may be shuttled
back and forth among various state and federal courts.' 4 Far too many
abstention cases have dragged along for almost a decade or more,'" some
of -them never reaching a decision on the merits." For these reasons alone
the abstention doctrine cannot be viewed as a particularly bright chapter
in the history of American jurisprudence.
II. SOME ATTEMPTS TOWARD SOLUTION
A. Codification of the Abstention Doctrine
The American Law Institute has proposed that several new sections
be added to Title 28 of the United States Code.' 7 Proposed section 137118
10. WRIGHT § 52.
11. E.g., Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943); Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman
Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941).
12. One can easily see how the possibility of a large judgment, hanging in suspense over
the years, could place a greater emotional strain on a litigant than if he had lost in the
early stages of the case and ended the matter.
13. See United States Life Ins. Co. v. Delaney, 396 S.W.2d 855 (Tex. 1965).
14. E.g., Government and Civic Employees Organizing Comm., CIO v. Windsor, 116
F. Supp. 354 (N.D. Ala. 1953), aff'd, 347 U.S. 901 (1954); Government and Civic Em-
ployees Organizing Comm., CIO v. Windsor, 262 Ala. 285, 78 So.2d 646 (1955) ; Government
and Civic Employees Organizing Comm., CIO v. Windsor, 353 U.S. 364 (1957); American
Fed'n of State, County and Municipal Employees v. Dawkins, 268 Ala. 13, 104 S.2d 827
(1958).
15. City of Thibodaux v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 373 F.2d 870 (5th Cir. 1967);
England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 384 U.S. 885 (1966).
16. United States v. Leiter Minerals, 381 U.S. 413 (1965).
17. ALI, STUDY OF THE DMzsioN OF JURISDIcTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS,
(Tent. Draft No. 6, 1968) [hereinafter cited as ALI, STUDY].
18. Id. at 38-40.
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deals with abstention and related problems, including certification of
questions of state law.
Subsection 1371(c) is basically a codification of the abstention doc-
trine. It reads:
A district court may stay an action, otherwise properly com-
menced in or removed to a district court under this title, on the
ground that the action presents issues of State law that ought
to be determined in a State proceeding, if the court finds: (1)
that the issues of State law cannot be satisfactorily determined
in the light of the State authorities; and (2) that abstention
from the exercise of federal jurisdiction is warranted either by
the likelihood that the necessity for deciding a substantial ques-
tion of federal constitutional law may thereby be avoided, or by
a serious danger of embarrassing the effectuation of State policies
by a decision of State law at variance with the view which may
be ultimately taken by the State court, or by other circumstances
of a like character; and (3) that a plain, speedy, and efficient
remedy may be had in the courts of such State; and (4) that the
parties' claims of federal right, if any, including any issues of
fact material thereto, can be adequately protected by review
of the State court decision by the Supreme Court of the United
States."'
According to the ALI Commentary on section 1371(c), clause (1)
is to insure that abstention will not take place where the court can reach
a satisfactory conclusion as to state law "in light of related state author-
ities," even though the state court may not have ruled directly on the
issue in controversy. The second condition reflects the court-made rule
that abstention is to be reserved for exceptional circumstances. Condition
three reflects policy already included in the Tax Injunction Act and the
Johnson Act.2" The fourth condition is to insure that federal rights are
adequately protected.2
The proposed statute does contain other limitations and exceptions
relating to the abstention doctrine. 22 However, for purposes of this paper,
the focus will be on subsections 1371(c) and 1371(e).
B. Certification of Questions of State Law
The Florida Legislature adopted its certification statute in 1945.23
The statute lay dormant until the Clay' case breathed life into it with
the United States Supreme Court's suggestion that Florida adopt a pro-
19. Id. at 38-39.
20. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1342(4) (1948).
21. ALI, STUDY at 210-12.
22. E.g., abstention is not permitted in civil rights cases.
23. FLA. STAT. § 25.031 (1946).
24. Clay v. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd., 363 U.S. 207 (1960).
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cedure for its use. A procedure was adopted, 5 and the state law question
in Clay was certified to the Supreme Court of Florida.26
Since that time certification procedures have been adopted by statute
in Hawaii ,27 Maine,2 ' and Washington,29 and the Commissioners on Uni-
form State Laws have recommended a certification statute.30 Certification
is permitted by court rule in Montana"1 and New Hampshire. 2 The stat-
utes of Florida and Hawaii restrict certification to federal appellate
courts. The other state statutes, as well as the proposed ALI statute,
permit certification by any court of the United States.
There are arguments for and against allowing certification by fed-
eral trial courts. Restricting certification to the appellate courts might
tend to encourage appeals that might not have been taken otherwise.
Furthermore, certification by a trial court could avoid the time and ex-
pense of a trial in some cases. This would certainly be true if the issue
in controversy was whether the complaint stated a cause of action under
state law. On the other hand, the question to be certified is more likely
to be ripe for decision after the case reaches an appellate court; and
certification by federal district courts could well lead to congestion on
the docket of the highest state court.
All of the state certification statutes require that the issue certified
be dispositive of the case, either by the language of the statute8 or by
court interpretation.3 4 Response to certification on the part of the state
courts is optional.
Subsection 1371(e) of the ALI's proposed statute reads:
A court of the United States may certify to the highest court
of a State a question of State Law, if (1) the State has estab-
lished a procedure by which its highest court may answer ques-
tions certified from such court of the United States; (2) the
question of State law may be controlling in the action and can-
25. FLA. APP. R. 4.61.
26. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd. v. Clay, 133 So.2d 735 (Fla. 1961).
27. HAWAII REV. LAWS 1955, tit. 26, ch. 214, §§ 26, 27, as amended, HAWAII LAWS
1965.
28. ME. REV. STAT., tit. 4, § 57, as amended, ME. ACTS 1965, ch. 158.
29. WASH. REV. CODE, ch. 2.60 (1965).
30. UNIFORMe CERTIFICATION OF QUESTIONS oF LAW ACT (1967).
31. MONT. SuP. CT. R. 1. The Montana Rule is quoted in Lewis v. Mid-Century Ins.
Co., 278 F. Supp. 238, 240, n.3 (D. Mont. 1967).
32. N.H. RSA 490: App R. 21.
33. The statutes of Florida and Hawaii permit certification of questions "which are
determinative" of the cause. The Washington statute provides that any federal court may
certify a question of local law "in order to dispose of such proceeding." However, the
Florida court has not interpreted its statute strictly. In Green v. American Tobacco Co., 154
So.2d 169 (Fla. 1963), the court answered the certified question, but pointed out that it
had not been asked to answer the ultimate question in the case.
34. The Maine statute permits certification of questions "which may be determinative of
the cause .... " ME. REV. STAT., tit. 4, § 57, as amended, ME. ACTS 1965, ch. 158. However,
the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine has read "may be" to mean "will be" and has refused
to answer a question which would not have disposed of the action. See In re Richards, 223
A.2d 827 (Me. 1966).
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not be satisfactorily determined in the light of the State auth-
orities; and (3) the court expressly finds that certification will
not cause undue delay or be prejudicial to the parties.85
The operation of the restrictions contained in section 1371(e) is
explained in the Commentary thereto as follows:
The first condition is that the state must have an established
procedure for answering questions certified by the federal court
in question. This provision avoids any implication that Congress,
by adopting this statute, is requiring all state courts to answer
certified questions, and it makes it clear that a district court may
not certify a question if, as in Florida and Hawaii, the local
certification statute permits the state court to accept questions
only from appellate courts.
The second condition describes the kinds of questions that
may be certified. The question must be a controlling one, and
it must be a question that cannot satisfactorily be answered in
the light of state authorities. Cf. § 1371(c)(1) ....
As presented in Tentative Draft No. 5, this would have
allowed certification if the state issue "is controlling" rather
than, as now proposed, "may be controlling." The federal court
cannot know that a state issue "is controlling" since this often
will depend on how the state court issue is answered. Thus, in
Clay v. Sun Insurance Office Ltd., 377 U.S. 179 (1964), the
answer of the Florida court would have been controlling if it
had said that the statute was inapplicable. Since, however, it held
that the statute applied, its answer was not controlling and...
[a] federal constitutional question . . . remained. What must
really be meant is that at least one possible answer the state
court can give to the question would determine the case ...
This thought is better expressed by using "may be" rather than
'is.
The final condition requires the court to find that certifica-
tion will not cause undue delay or be prejudicial to the parties.
In some circumstances almost any delay may be prejudicial, as
where suit is by a penniless tort claimant, or an impoverished
widow is suing on a life insurance policy. In such cases the pres-
sure to accept an inadequate settlement would be increased if
certification were ordered. In applying the third condition the
courts should also be especially reluctant to certify at the in-
stance of a defendant who has removed a case to federal court.
It is ordinarily undesirable to allow a defendant a federal deter-
mination of facts and a state determination of state law at the
cost of delay to a plaintiff who was content to have the whole
case promptly determined in the state courts. 6
35. ALI, STUDY at 39.
36. Id. at 216-18.
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III. THE CONTROVERSY OVER CERTIFICATION
The United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit, has had more
experience with certification than any other federal court, yet even among
its members there is division as to the desirability of the procedure. At
the Forty-third Annual Meeting of the American Law Institute it was
Judge Minor Wisdom, of the Fifth Circuit, who moved to delete the
provision for certification from section 1371.17 On the other hand, Chief
Judge Brown favors certification,38 and the frequent use of the device by
the Fifth Circuit indicates that other members of that court agree with
him. The Reporters for section 1371 of the ALI statute opposed certifi-
cation,39 but were overruled by a vote of the Institute. °
In a recent case, the Supreme Court of Washington approved the use
of certification by a vote of 6-3."' The dissenting judges argued that
certification was unlawful under the state constitution and unwise as
a matter of policy.
Thus it can be seen that the controversy over certification is a live
one, and at present the proponents of the procedure seem to be winning.
In determining whether certification is desirable it is necessary to consider
the problem in light of several different and conflicting policies and goals
which must be separately evaluated and balanced against each other.
Opinions will vary as to the relative importance of certain policies. The
writer, firmly convinced that courts and court procedures are for the
benefit of litigants rather than legal theoreticians, warns the reader of a
strong bias against certification.
IV. THE CASE FOR CERTIFICATION
A. Authoritative Answers and Protection of Federal Rights
Certification allows the federal courts to obtain authoritative answers
to difficult questions of state law, while preserving the right of the parties
to a federal determination of the facts and of issues of law not certified.
The form of the question and the record certified are under the control
of the federal court, thus assuring that the facts will be determined cor-
rectly in light of the federal issues that may be involved in the case. Since
the federal court retains jurisdiction over the entire case, it may vacate
its stay and decide all of the issues, state and federal, if it appears that
the state court is not acting with proper dispatch. 2
37. 43 ALI Proceedings 373 (1966).
38. See his concurring and dissenting opinion in W. S. Ranch Co. v. Kaiser Steel Corp.,
388 F.2d 257, 262 (10th Cir. 1967), rev'd sub nora. Kaiser Steel Corp. v. W.S. Ranch Co.,
391 U.S. 592 (1968).
39. ALI, STUDY at 214.
40. 43 ALI Proceedings 385 (1966).
41. In re Elliot, 446 P.2d 347 (Wash. 1968).
42. ALI, STUDY at 214.
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B. Consistency in Results
Inaccuracy in forecasting state law developments has been a prime
factor in motivating the Fifth Circuit toward the use of certification and
abstention. Chief Judge Brown believes that injustice to litigants results
when a state court subsequently disagrees with a federal court on an issue
of state law, and that the delay involved in abstention and certification
is a small price to pay to avoid the inconsistency which is a consequence
of a federal court being ultimately "overruled" by a state court.43
One of the best examples of the use of certification to avoid incon-
sistent results is the case of Norton v. Benjamin.4' The issue was whether
a general release barred a cross-claim for contribution and indemnity in
an automobile accident case. The district court certified the question and
the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine answered it affirmatively without
much delay. Since there were no state precedents on point, the state court
had to choose among decisions of other jurisdictions which were at vari-
ance with each other. The same federal district court had decided the
same issue in an earlier case (before certification was possible)4" and
had reached a conclusion different from that of the state court in Norton.
The case illustrates that certification can work in practice as well as in
theory.
C. Certification May Be Preferable to Abstention
Certification avoids the time and cost of litigating a question through
the lower state courts (as is often required when abstention is ordered)4"
because the question is certified directly to the highest state court. It also
avoids the possibility of a redetermination of the facts by a state trial
court which could render valueless an answer sought by a federal court.
D. Promotes Federalism
It would be hard to deny that there exists a certain amount of tension
in the relationship between state and federal courts. Federal courts are
constantly reviewing the propriety of state court criminal convictions. A
federal district judge may order the release of a prisoner whose convic-
tion has been affirmed by two levels of state appellate courts.
Certification permits the federal courts to defer to the judgment of
the highest state court on uncertain issues of state law. "The feeling that
the federal court [is] 'cooperating' in the search for state law rather than
seeking to impose its will upon the state might even make state judges
43. See his concurring and dissenting opinion in W.S. Ranch Co. v. Kaiser Steel Corp.,
388 F.2d 257, 262 (10th Cir. 1967), rev'd sub nom. Kaiser Steel Corp. v. W.S. Ranch Co.,
391 U.S. 592 (1968).
44. 220 A.2d 248 (Me. 1966).
45. Buckley v. Basford, 184 F. Supp. 870 (D. Me. 1960).
46. See, e.g., United Servi¢ce Life Ins. Co. v. Delaney, 328 F.2d 483 (5th Cir. 1964).
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more receptive to federal views, when federal questions [are] before state
judiciaries."47
V. THE CASE AGAINST CERTIFICATION
A. Delay
Probably the worst indictment of the certification procedure from
the standpoint of delay is the drawn-out saga of Green v. American
Tobacco Co." The first trial started in December, 1957. The jury re-
turned a general verdict for the defendant cigarette manufacturer and
in answer to written interrogatories found that: (1) Mr. Green did have
cancer in his left lung; (2) it was one of the causes of his death; (3)
smoking the defendant's cigarettes was one of the proximate causes of
his death; and (4) the defendant could not have known, even by the
application of reasonable skill and foresight, that inhalation of the smoke
from its cigarettes would endanger Mr. Green. 9
On May 2, 1962, the Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit, affirmed a
judgment for the defendant. On June 20, 1962, the same court granted
a petition for rehearing to the extent necessary to certify a question of
law to the Supreme Court of Florida.' °
The following question was certified:
Does the law of Florida impose on a manufacturer and
distributor of cigarettes absolute liability, as for breach of im-
plied warranty, for death caused by using such cigarettes . . .
when the defendant manufacturer and distributor could not...
by reasonable application of human skill and foresight, have
known that the users of such cigarettes would be endangered,
by the inhalation of the main stream smoke from such cigarettes,
of contracting cancer of the lung?'
On June 5, 1963, the Supreme Court of Florida answered the certi-
fied question in the affirmative. 2 However, in its opinion the court indi-
cated that it had not been asked to determine the ultimate issue in the
case, namely, whether the cigarettes were reasonably fit for human con-
sumption.
Thus, on December 11, 1963, the Fifth Circuit remanded the case
for a new trial. The court held that a jury instruction had been prejudicial
to the plaintiff at the first trial in light of the answer by the Florida court. 5
47. Note, Abstention and Certification in Diversity Suits: "Perfection of Means and
Confusion of Goals," 73 YALE L.J. 850, 865 (1964).
48. 391 F.2d 97 (5th Cir. 1968), rev'd on rehearing en bane No. 22435 (5th Cir. Apr. 8,
1969).
49. Green v. American Tobacco Co., 304 F.2d 70 (5th Cir. 1962).
50. Id. at 86.
51. Green v. American Tobacco Co., 154 So.2d 169 (Fla. 1963).
52. Id.
53. Green v. American Tobacco Co., 325 F.2d 673 (5th Cir. 1963).
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The issues determined by the written interrogatories in the first trial
were not to be relitigated.
On May 25, 1964, the United States Supreme Court denied certio-
rari,54 and the case proceeded toward its second trial. The result was an-
other verdict and judgment for the defendant.
Early in 1968, the Fifth Circuit granted a judgment for the plaintiff
and ordered a new trial on the issue of damages.55 On petition for re-
hearing en banc the court receded from the decision of the majority of
the panel and affirmed the judgment of the lower court for the defendant,
eleven years having passed since the first trial."'
The Clay57 case presents another dim chapter in the relatively brief
history of certification. The suit was brought on May 20, 1957, to recover
$6,800 on a personal property insurance policy. A decision on the merits
was finally reached on May 18, 1964, after two trips to the United States
Supreme Court,5" two trips to the Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit,59 and
one trip to the Supreme Court of Florida.6 ° The conclusion was the same
as that reached by the trial judge. In fairness, it must be added that part
of the delay resulted because Florida had not yet adopted a procedure to
use its certification statute. However, the delay caused by certification
alone has been more than one year in most of the cases where the pro-
cedure has been used.
The delay caused by certifying questions to state courts is not
limited to the immediate case in which a question has been certified. It
also causes delay for litigants in the state court system who must await
a decision on a certified question before they can have their own cases
decided. This delay may not be long, but its effects must be multiplied by
the number of litigants on the state court docket at the time that the
state court turns from its normal work in order to answer a certified
question. As Judge Hale pointed out in his dissenting opinion in Thiry
v. Atlantic Monthly Company:61
The question of speed, of course, gives rise to another ques-
tion of policy. At the time the instant case was argued ... this
court had pending a backlog of approximately 700 cases, some
of which were of high precedential value and of exigent impor-
tance to the parties.
In federal courts it takes as long to determine that a case should be certi-
fied as it does to decide a case on its merits.
54. American Tobacco Co. v. Green, 377 U.S. 943 (1964).
55. Green v. American Tobacco Co., 391 F.2d 97 (5th Cir. 1968).
56. Green v. American Tobacco Co., No. 22435 (5th Cir. Apr. 8, 1969). Three dissent-
ing judges would have had the court certify a question once again to the Supreme Court
of Florida, hoping perhaps, that the suit would not go on for another eleven years.
57. Clay v. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd., 363 U.S. 207 (1960).
58. Clay v. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd., 377 U.S. 179 (1964).
59. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd. v. Clay, 265 F.2d 522 (5th Cir. 1959) ; 319 F.2d 505 (5th Cir.
1963).
60. Clay v. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd., 133 So.2d 735 (Fla. 1961).
61. 445 P.2d 1012, 1014-15 (Wash. 1968).
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There have been cases where the delay caused by certification was
less than one year. 2 However, among those cases, it would seem that
questions certified by the United States Supreme Court might well have
been moved to the head of the state court docket out of respect for the
Supreme Court. Such a procedure would not seem justified if the question
was certified by a lower federal court.
B. Certification, as Presently Proposed and Practiced, Is Contrary
to the Overall Policy of Section 1371 and Other
Generally Recognized Policies
1. PIECEMEAL ADJUDICATION
If it is true, as contended by some proponents of certification, that
state courts are sometimes less than adequate in making findings of fact
and framing issues of law in light of federal law standards, then the re-
verse proposition must also be true to at least some extent. That is, federal
courts may be less than adequate, at times, in framing issues of law and
finding the correct facts for appying state law standards. The certification
of the wrong question in the Green case illustrates this point. 3 The case
went to the state court and back to the federal court, and the final solu-
tion was the same as that reached by Judge Choate at the first trial.
One of the purposes of section 1371 of the ALI statute is to prevent
shuttling cases back and forth between state and federal courts in ab-
stention cases. This policy is expressed in the Commentary and in the
provisions of section 1371(c). If it was a factor to be weighed in deter-
mining whether to restrict the abstention doctrine, then certainly it must
be a factor to be weighed in deciding whether to have a certification pro-
cedure.
If there ever was a way in which to delay a case as it moves
slowly through the courts . . . it would be the very procedure
whereby at one stage the case comes to a halt in the federal
system, moves over into the state system to await docketing,
briefing, hearing, writing, filing of the opinion and petition for
rehearing and then moves back again into the system of origin
to take its place on the judicial conveyor for resumption of pro-
ceedings in the federal system .... [T] he certification procedure
is a dilatory one and in the long run compounds the very delays
it is claimed to help curtail .... 0'
62. Aldrich v. Aldrich, 375 U.S. 75 (1963) ; Martinez v. Rodriquez, 394 F.2d 156 (5th
Cir. 1968), question answered in 215 So.2d 305 (Fla. 1968).
63. The Fifth Circuit has since sought to alleviate the difficulties encountered in phras-
ing the proper question to be asked by emphasizing, in its certificates, "that the particular
phrasing used in the certified question is not to restrict the Supreme Court's consideration
of the problems involved and the issues as the Supreme Court perceives them to be in its
analysis of the record certified . . ." Martinez v. Rodriques, 394 F.2d 156, 159 n.6 (5th Cir.
1968). However, this approach would not work in states where the court may not give
advisory opinions. See In re Richards, 223 A.2d 827 (Me. 1966).
64. In re Elliot, 446 P.2d 347, 371 (Wash. 1968) (dissenting opinion).
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Piecemeal adjudication also increases the cost of litigation. This
point was referred to by Justice Douglas, in his dissent, the first time
the Clay case reached the Supreme Court:
I desire to give renewed protest to our practice of making
litigants travel a long, expensive road in order to obtain justice.
Congress has created federal courts with power to adjudicate
controversies between citizens of different States. They are
manned by judges drawn from the local Bars and fairly con-
versant with the laws of their respective areas ....
Some litigants have long purses. Many, however, can
hardly afford one lawsuit, let alone two. Shuttling the parties be-
tween state and federal tribunals is a sure way of defeating the
ends of justice. The pursuit of justice is not an academic exercise.
There are no foundations to finance the resolution of nice state
law questions involved in federal court litigation. The parties are
entitled-absent unique and rare situations-to adjudication of
their rights in the tribunals which Congress has empowered
to act.65
In Clay, the printing costs alone probably exceeded the $6,800 in
controversy.
All of the present certification procedures require that briefs be
filed along with the question that is certified. It is usually necessary and
desirable for the record on appeal to be transmitted to the court that is
to answer the question. In effect, two appeals are created where only one
existed before. This concept of two for one might be desirable when
growing stalks of wheat, but its value is negative in the field of legal
appeals.
2. CONTRARY TO THE MEREDITH DOCTRINE
Another policy underlying section 1371 of the ALI statute is to
restrict the use of the abstention doctrine so that a federal court could
not abstain merely to avoid deciding a difficult question of state law.66
Although the three cases where the Supreme Court has used certification
involved questions of state law which might have avoided the necessity
of deciding federal constitutional questions,67 the lower federal courts
have used certification merely to avoid answering "difficult" questions
of state law.68
65. Clay v. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd., 363 U.S. 207, 227-28 (1960).
66. ALI, STUDY at 203-20.
67. In Clay the issue was whether Florida could apply a statute which voided a clause
in an insurance policy when the policy had been executed and delivered in Illinois. Aldrich
v. Aldrich, 375 U.S. 75 (1963), 378 U.S. 540 (1964), involved a divorce decree granted in
Florida, which, if valid, could be enforced in West Virginia. In Dresner v. City of Talla-
hassee, 375 U.S. 136 (1963), 378 U.S. 539 (1964), the question was whether the defendant
could have had the constitutional issues in his appeal reviewed by a higher Florida court.
68. See, e.g., Martinez v. Rodriquez, 394 F.2d 156 (5th Cir. 1968).
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In Meredith v. City of Winter Haven,69 the court held:
[T]he difficulties of ascertaining what the state courts may
hereafter determine the state law to be do not in themselves
afford a sufficient ground for a federal court to decline to exer-
cise its jurisdiction ....
... In the absence of some recognized public policy or de-
fined principle guiding the exercise of the jurisdiction conferred,
which would in exceptional cases warrant its non-exercise, it has
from the first been deemed to be the duty of the federal courts
.. to decide questions of state law whenever necessary to the
rendition of a judgment .... 70
This doctrine was reaffirmed in McNeese v. Board of Education.71
During the Proceedings of the American Law Institute in 1966 a
motion was made to delete any provision for certification from section
137 1.72 It seemed that there would be considerable controversy over the
issue of certification; therefore, Judge Friendly proposed a compromise
between the opposing factions. His view was that it was "rather incon-
sistent to have a carefully limited provision as to abstention and an ab-
solutely open-end permission on the certification. 78 He then proposed
that certification be limited to those situations where abstention would be
allowed under section 1371(c). If certification was restricted in such a
manner federal courts could not use the procedure merely to avoid answer-
ing difficult questions of state law.
No vote was ever taken on Judge Friendly's proposed compromise.
Judge Davis, who seconded the original motion to delete the certification
provision altogether, refused to agree to a modification of the motion. His
reason was that Judge Gignoux, of the United States District Court in
Maine, had earlier spoken in favor of certification.74 In doing so he
described a case, then before him, that seemed to be an ideal situation
for the use of Maine's newly adopted certification procedure. Judge Davis
thought Judge Friendly's compromise would not include within its scope
the case propounded by Judge Gignoux, and that it would be misleading,
under those circumstances, to amend the original motion.75 The original
motion to delete certification altogether was voted on and soundly de-
feated.76 Ironically, Judge Gignoux eventually did certify a question from
the case he had described, and the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine re-
fused to answer the question.77
The availability of a certification procedure has resulted in the
69. 320 U.S. 228 (1943).
70. Id. at 234-35.
71. 373 U.S. 668, 673, n.5 (1963).
72. 43 ALI Proceedings 373 (1966).
73. Id. at 381.
74. Id. at 374-77.
75. Id. at 383.
76. Id. at 385.
77. In re Richards, 223 A.2d 827 (Me. 1966).
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federal courts forgetting the teaching of Meredith v. City of Winter
Haven,7 8 and using the procedure merely to resolve difficult questions of
state law. In Life Insurance Co. of Virginia v. Shifflet"9 the plaintiff sub-
mitted an application for insurance in which he unwittingly made some
clearly incorrect statements on matters highly material to the risk. A
Florida statute does not allow recovery on an insurance policy when in-
correct statements on the application are either "(1) [f]raudulent; or (2)
[m]aterial either to the acceptance of the risk, or to the hazard assumed
by the insurer . . .,.8" After initially affirming the judgment against the
insurer, the court granted a rehearing and certified the issue to the Su-
preme Court of Florida. The state court found the statute unambiguous
and subject to but one construction. 8 1 Thus, fifteen months after its
original decision, the Fifth Circuit reversed and ruled in favor of the
insurer.8
2
Vandercook & Son, Inc. v. Thorpe"3 is an example of a court's failure
to analyze the state cases that were available at the time of the original
decision. An employee who had been injured by a defective printing press
brought suit against the manufacturer who sold the press to his employer.
The cause of action was breach of implied warranty. On the first hear-
ing of the appeal the court ruled for the defendant manufacturer.8 4 On re-
hearing, the court asked the parties to brief the appropriateness of certifi-
cation. The court then decided in light of the Florida cases it cited, that
certification was unnecessary. The court concluded that in Florida an
employee could recover and remanded the case for new trial on the issue
of the defendant's liability.8 5
An analysis of the very cases cited by the court in Vandercook show
that the decision was probably wrong.' Furthermore, those cases were
available, but not cited, during the first hearing of the case when the
court had "guessed" right, apparently for no reason at all. Although no
question was certified to the Florida court in Vandercook, the case does
demonstrate the Fifth Circuit's willingness to use certification merely to
avoid having to make a determination as to state law.
In Thiry v. Atlantic Monthly Company87 the majority of the Su-
preme Court of Washington pointed out that the question certified was
78. 320 U.S. 228 (1943).
79. 359 F.2d 501 (5th Cir. 1966).
80. FLA. STAT. § 627.01081 (1959).
81. Life Ins. Co. of Virginia v. Shifflet, 201 So.2d 715 (Fla. 1967).
82. 380 F.2d 375 (5th Cir. 1967).
83. 344 F.2d 930 (5th Cir. 1965).
84. 322 F.2d 638 (5th Cir. 1963).
85. 344 F.2d 930 (5th Cir. 1965).
86. In McBurnette v. Playground Equip. Corp., 137 So.2d 563 (Fla. 1962), a minor
child was permitted to sue the retailer who sold a piece of playground equipment to her
father. However, Carter v. Hector Supply Co., 128 So.2d 391 (Fla. 1961), held that an
employee could not sue, for breach of implied warranty, the retailer who had sold a de-
fective sulky to his employer. McBurnette did not overrule Carter.
87. 445 P.2d 1012 (Wash. 1968).
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clearly answered by prior state court precedents. Nevertheless, the court
went on to answer the certified question. Judge Hale, in dissent, would
have refused to answer the question, remarking that:
the law on [the] subject has been well settled, and I do not
fully understand why learned counsel were unable to make this
clear to the trial judge .... To me, the question appears to re-
late to one of the few areas where the law seems to be about as
clear as it ever gets.88
Martinez v. Rodriquez89 and Hopkins v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp. °
were both certified before the Fifth Circuit attempted to formulate its
own opinion as to the result in those cases. These cases represent an
abdication of the responsibility imposed by Congress to adjudicate cases
when federal jurisdiction has properly been invoked. There would not
have been any danger of embarrassing the effectuation of state policies
in any of the cases cited under this heading, even if the Fifth Circuit had
reached a different result than the state court. Nor were there any state
or federal constitutional questions involved.
Before abstention would be permitted under section 1371(c) of the
ALI statute, the court would have to find (among other things) that
abstention "is warranted either [ 1] by the likelihood that the necessity
for deciding a substantial question of federal constitutional law may
thereby be avoided, or [2] by a serious danger of embarrassing the
effectuation of State policies .... .91
It is suggested that, if certification is to be permitted at all, one of
these two circumstances must be found to exist. This could be accom-
plished by incorporating these restrictions along with those already con-
tained in section 1371(e).
3. PLAIN, SPEEDY, AND EFFICIENT REMEDY
One of the expressed policies to be found in section 1371, and
throughout the law generally, is that litigants should be provided with
a plain, speedy, and efficient remedy. The history of certification has
shown that it is capable of being neither plain, nor speedy, nor efficient.
Although there are signs of improvement in the speed of the procedure,
it can be argued that it is not worth any of the delay and cost inherent
in its use.
Let us look at certification from the viewpoint of the litigant. Sup-
pose that P and. D have litigated a case in good faith before a federal
district court, and that P lost. All of the facts were stipulated, and the
only issue for decision was a question of state law that could not be
88. Id. at 1015 (dissenting opinion).
89. 394 F.2d 156 (5th Cir. 1968).
90. 358 F.2d 347 (5th Cir. 1966).
91. ALI, STUDY at 38.
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satisfactorily determined in the light of the state authorities. P now wants
to appeal, and the following facts are explained to him:
1. There is no way to tell how the federal appellate court will
rule because there is no satisfactory way of telling how the
state supreme court would rule on the question.
2. If there is some indication of how the state court would rule
between now and the time that the appeal is decided, the
federal court can be expected to follow that indication.
3. Both the federal court and the state court are composed of
honest and able judges, but, the state judges are more
familiar with state law.
4. The federal court is required to decide the issue as it thinks
the state court would decide it.
5. The federal court might "guess wrong" as to how the state
court would decide the issue, since there is no satisfactory
way to determine how the state court would decide it.
Now we give P a choice. We tell him that he can either: (1) appeal
to the federal court and let it decide the issue; or (2) appeal to the
federal court and have it certify the question to the state court for its
decision. If he chooses the second alternative it will delay the decision
by six months and cost P sixty-four dollars extra.
Assuming that the delay would cause P little concern, the sixty-four
dollar question is: What logical reason would P have for choosing certi-
fication?
The point to be made is that litigants expect no more than a fair
hearing from honest and able judges who are doing the best job they
can. They know nothing of the Erie doctrine and the intricate theoretical
questions it can create. And, if the doctrine were explained to them, they
would probably not choose to finance the answers to those intricate
questions.
Congress has imposed upon the federal courts the duty to adjudicate
cases whenever jurisdiction is properly invoked. Every time a federal
court certifies a question of law to a state court, it is forcing the litigants
to pay for having someone else do the job of the federal court. That the
question is difficult to answer is not reason enough for exacting such
payment.
C. Forum Shopping
One of the main purposes of the Erie doctrine is the elimination of
forum shopping. 2 The certification procedure may well produce a form
of "eleventh-hour forum shopping."
The federal appellate courts have already demonstrated that they
will consider certification even after they have reached a decision on the
merits.93 Thus, an attorney who loses an appeal that turns on an unclear
92. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 73-75 (1938). Erie was cited for this
proposition in Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 467-68 (1965) (dicta).
93. See, e.g., Green v. American Tobacco Co., 304 F.2d 70 (1962) and Vandercook &
Son, Inc. v. Thorpe, 322 F.2d 638 (5th Cir. 1963), rehearing, 344 F.2d 930 (5th Cir. 1965).
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issue of state law would seem almost duty bound to petition for a re-
hearing with the suggestion that the question be certified to the state
court. Although certification would produce a theoretically correct an-
swer, its effect in such a situation would be the same as if the referee in
a basketball game gave the losing team enough points to produce a tie.
The game would then go into overtime.
D. "Guesses" as to State Law Should Not Offend the State
Unless there is a "serious danger of embarrassing the effectuation
of State policies by a decision of State law at variance with the view
which may be ultimately taken by the State court," 4 it is difficult to see
how a state could be offended when a federal court "guesses" what the
state law will be. Without getting into the philosophical complexities of
whether state law exists as a brooding omnipresence (even when it is not
discernible to the eye of a federal judge), the very least that could be
said is that undeclared state law has not yet been revealed. If the state
law either does not exist, or has not yet been revealed, the state should
not be offended when a federal court decision is at variance with the
ultimate view taken by the state court.
Some would argue that such variance in decisions results in "in-
justice" to the litigants. 5 The answer to that argument is that no one
court has a monopoly on justice. When state and federal courts reach
different conclusions as to the law, who is to say which of them arrived
at the "just" result?
It could also be argued that the variance itself is an injustice, and
that Erie aims not only at forum shopping, but also at the "inequitable
administration of the laws."96 However, the pronouncements of the Su-
preme Court would seem to indicate that the inequities Erie seeks to cure
are those that may occur after state law has been declared."7 When state
law is undeclared, all Erie requires is that the federal court do the best
it can "to choose the rule which it believes the state court, from all that
is known about its methods of reaching decisions, is likely in the future
to adopt. '9 8 The same principle should apply when state law is unclear
or out of date.
It is quite possible that state courts might benefit by having federal
court opinions on undeclared or out of date state law.9 9 Whether or not
they agree with the decision of a federal court, they might be aided in
94. ALI, STUDY at 38, § 1371(c)(2).
95. See Judge Brown's concurring and dissenting opinion in W.S. Ranch Co. v. Kaiser
Steel Corp., 388 F.2d 257, 262 (10th Cir. 1967).
96. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 468 (1965) (dicta).
97. Cf. Meredith v. City of Winter Haven, 320 US. 228 (1943).
98. WRIGHT § 58 at 206.
99. See, e.g., Daily v. Parker, 152 F.2d 174 (7th Cir. 1945), followed in Johnson v.
Luhman, 330 Ill. App. 598, 71 N.E.2d 810 (1947).
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arriving at their own decision from an analysis of the federal opinion.
Law is a creative process, and judges can benefit from the mistakes, as
well as the triumphs, of those who have faced similar problems.
Although Judge Brown laments over the number of times federal
courts have been "reversed" by state courts,' he fails to take into ac-
count the times that state courts have ultimately agreed with federal
courts. Is it not possible that such agreement may be, at least in part,
the result of the reasoning and articulation of issues by the federal court?
E. Advisory Opinions
The courts of some states lack the power to give answers to ques-
tions certified by federal courts. This is because they are forbidden by
their state constitutions from giving what would amount to an advisory
opinion."" Other state courts have proved quite willing to give advisory
opinions.1
02
Even if a state has a procedure for certification, the federal courts
must be wary of the possibility of a rule against advisory opinions. In
the case of In re Richards'1 the court refused to answer a question
certified to it. The court indicated that an answer to a certified question
would amount to an advisory opinion unless all the material facts had
either been agreed upon or found by the federal court. It insisted that
the case must be in such a posture that the state court's decision of the
applicable Maine law would in truth and in fact be determinative of the
cause.
VI. CONCLUSION
In deciding questions of state law, federal judges should be able
to use the same processes as are available to state judges. In making
their decisions they should not be restricted to past decisions of the state
courts, nor should they be required or encouraged to seek answers to
difficult questions of state law from state courts, except in extreme and
rare circumstances. Although Erie requires that the federal courts use
past state court decisions as a guidelight in reaching their decisions,
federal judges should have available to them "the same sources as are
available to state judges in deciding issues of state law .. . ."'0' This is
especially true in areas where new trends have developed in other juris-
dictions, and the state court of the forum has not reviewed the issue in
question for many years.
100. He cites several examples in United Services Life Ins. Co. v. Delaney, 328 F.2d
483, 486-87 nn. 5-9 (5th Cir. 1963) and in the opinion cited in note 95 supra.
101. See, e.g., United Services Life Ins. Co. v. Delaney, 396 S.W.2d 855 (Tex. 1965).
102. Leiter Minerals, Inc. v. California Co., 241 La. 915, 132 So.2d 845 (1961). Cf.
Sun Ins. Office, Ltd. v. Clay, 133 So.2d 735 (Fla. 1961).
103. 223 A.2d 827 (Me. 1966).
104. Clark, Federal Procedural Reform and State's Rights; to a More Perfect Union,
40 TEx. L. REv. 211, 224 (1961). See also, Cardozo, Choosing and Declaring State Law:
Deference to State Courts Versus Federal Responsibility, 55 Nw. U.L. REv. 419 (1960),
and Corbin, The Laws of the Several States, 50 YALE L.J. 762 (1941).
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Although abstention may be justified in the rare instances circum-
scribed by the proposed ALI statute, this does not mean that certification
is necessary or even desirable. The proposed statute allows abstention,
but the policy of the statute is designed to let one court decide all of
the issues. If the federal court thinks that the federal rights of a party
are in jeopardy, it is called on to weigh that factor in deciding whether
or not to abstain. If the federal judge reaches a decision to abstain, after
carefully weighing all the factors, a state court determination of all the
issues is res judicata and subject to review only by the Supreme Court.1"'
The present certification provision of section 1371 is far too broad.
It would not restrict certification in any of the cases discussed in this
article. If the certification provision must be kept, it should at least be
restricted within the same limits as abstention.
The Commentary to section 1371(e) suggests that a federal court
should be loathe to certify a state law question at the request of a de-
fendant who has removed a case to a federal court. °6 The same admo-
nition should apply to the plaintiff who brings his claim to a federal
court in the first place, loses at the trial level and at the appellate level,
and then requests certification on rehearing at the appellate level.
It is also questionable whether certification is proper if neither
party requests it.10
7
Thus far six states have adopted certification procedures, and it is
likely that many more will follow suit in the near future because of the
adoption of the Uniform Certification of Questions of Law Act. If the
use of the procedure is to be restricted to exceptional situations, such
restriction will have to come from congressional legislation or from a
decision of the Supreme Court. That restriction of the use of certification
to exceptional situations is desirable is borne out by the fact that the
recent use of certification has exacted too high a price for theoretically
correct answers to Erie-posed problems.
105. ALI, STuDY at 39, 212-13.
106. Id. at 217-18.
107. Cf. Hostetter v. Idlewilde Bon Voyage Liquor Corp., 377 U.S. 324 (1964), where
the court gave this factor at least some weight in refusing to abstain.
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